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Abstract 
 
We investigate the effects of market power, banking and bank-environment activities on 
profitability and stability (risk and returns) for a total of 1929 banks in 40 emerging and 
advanced economies over the sample period of 1999-2008.  The model developed in this 
paper incorporates the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and the relative-
market-power (RMP) hypotheses with the view to assessing the extent to which the bank 
performance can be attributed to non-competitive market conditions and pricing behaviour.  
The key findings are as follows; i) a greater market power leads to higher bank performance 
being biased toward the RMP hypothesis in advanced economies; ii) more concentrated 
banking systems in advanced economies may be more vulnerable to financial instability; iii) 
Neither of the hypotheses seems to be supported for the returns in the emerging banking 
sector; and iv) higher interest rate spreads increase profitability and stability for both types of 
economies, however, for emerging banks this seems to be one of the key elements to increase 
their profitability raising concerns on economies.  Other interesting findings include that off-
balance-sheet activities appear to present banks with a trade-off between risk and returns in 
advanced economies, and the effects of bank age, bank ownership status and regulation on 
risk and returns, depend on market power. 
Keywords: Market structure; Concentration; Competition; Bank profitability; Risk; 
Emerging economies 
JEL classifications: G01, G21, G28 
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1.     Introduction 
Financial intermediation is essential for economic development. The international banking 
industry has undergone substantial structural reforms over the last two decades. There have 
been fundamental changes in the behaviour of banks with more emphasis on profitability and 
comprehensive asset management in recent period. It is particularly important for emerging 
countries to ensure that the banking system is stable and efficient. Such a banking 
development should lead to private and infrastructural projects being financed effectively and 
allocated efficiently. As Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) argue, because of phenomena 
such as globalization, growing international financial markets, deregulation and advances in 
technology, identifying the determinants of bank performance is an important predictor of 
unstable economic conditions. Athanasoglou et al. (2008) also point out that a profitable 
banking system is likely to absorb negative shocks, thus maintaining the stability of the 
financial system. In this respect, it is important to investigate the effectiveness of emerging 
banks. How banks are affected by increased competitive pressures, depends partly on how 
efficiently they are run. Banks can increase their profitability through either improvement of 
their cost efficiency or exerting their market power. The latter approach to make profit can 
reduce total social welfare.   
 This paper empirically investigate the effect of market structure in banks on 
profitability and stability, in particular whether banks, who are operating in concentrated 
markets generate more profit or not, whilst taking into account of the bank-specific 
characteristics; whether banks are efficiently managed.  We also examine overall effect of 
financial structure and macroeconomic conditions; whether financial development and 
business cycles affect bank risk and returns. Making an allowance for the differences between 
banks operated in emerging and developed countries, identifying the factors that lead to these 
differences may explain the effectiveness of financial institutions and help us understand the 
banking industry in emerging economies.    
We utilizes data from 23 emerging economies (10 Eastern Europe and 13 Middle East 
countries) and 17 Western European countries, containing a relatively large panel set with a 
total of 1929 banks over the period 1999-2008.  Tests of market power hypotheses are 
performed by regressing bank performance indicators against measures of market power 
together with bank-specific characters, bank environment activities and financial structure 
variables.  
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The purpose of this study is to address some fundamental questions. Firstly, can the 
market power hypothesis be applied to the emerging market banking system? Secondly, why 
are banks operated in the emerging economies more profitable than their counterparts in 
advanced economies? Thirdly, to what extent are discrepancies in determinants of bank risk 
and returns due to variations in factors under the control of bank management and/or factors 
relating financial structures? To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet attempted to 
address these questions. We, systematically, compare the emerging market banking systems 
with their counterparts in advanced markets.  Since there is a wide interest in the effect of 
augmented competition and deregulation on banking systems, the results of this study may 
help understanding the key determinants of banking performance in both developing and 
developed economies. Furthermore, the financial sector in emerging economies has been in 
transition and undergoing serious reforms, such as financial deepening, consolidation and 
liberalization, and that more economic insight is needed to support further development. 
There are also important implications for both microeconomic theory and antitrust policy. 
The market structure matters for the bank’s power in setting interest rates that can 
directly affect its performance. A positive statistical relationship between measures of market 
structure, such as concentration or market share, and profitability has been reported by many 
banking studies (e.g. See Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Berger, 1995).  Berger (1995) 
advocates two hypotheses which support such a relationship. One of them is the traditional 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, which confirms that, in highly concentrated 
markets, firms set prices that are less favourable to consumers, as a result of imperfectly 
competitive markets. In the concentrated markets, a bank can impose higher interest spreads, 
by setting higher lending rates and lower deposit rates. The other one is the relative-market-
power (RMP) paradigm where firms with well-differentiated products can exercise their 
market power in pricing products, thus earning supernormal profits. Moreover, such a 
positive relationship could also be explained in terms of efficiency. In Berger (1995), two 
efficient-structure hypotheses are utilised in explaining why market power can lead to higher 
profits. The x-efficiency asserts that firms with superior management of production and 
technologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits. The scale-efficiency hypothesis 
claims that firms tend to have equally good management and technology, but some simply 
produce at more efficient scales than others, and as a result, have lower unit costs and higher 
unit profits. One question that arises here is whether profitability in emerging banks can be 
explained by the SCP and/or RMP hypothesis. A number of studies have examined the 
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effects of market concentration on competitive conditions and bank risk and returns in 
developed markets, but not for emerging economies.    
Another question which we attempt to answer is why bank profitability in emerging 
markets is higher than those observed in advanced markets. In effect, we assess to what 
extent relatively high bank profitability in emerging banks can be attributed to a low degree 
of efficiency or to non-competitive market conditions. Moreover, an inadequate regulatory 
banking environment with a higher degree of information asymmetry can lead to high 
profitability.  In this context, high profits are indicative of high risk premium, which can 
cause financial instability (Hellmann et al., 2000). Therefore, our research objective is to 
analyse whether the relatively high returns of banks operating in emerging countries in the 
Middle East and the Eastern European countries are caused by a low degree of cost for given 
market conditions or by exerting market power due to weak regulatory constraints. 
In order to elaborate the level of profitability and market structure in both types of 
economy, we measure return on assets for 308 selected banks
2
 located in developing 
countries (Eastern Europe and Middle East) and 1621 selected banks in developed countries 
(Western Europe) over the sample period. Figures 1 illustrates the trend of returns on average 
assets (ROAA) in emerging and advanced banks during the period1999-2008. Bank 
profitability in the emerging economies was extremely high, compared to that observed for 
mature economies. It is evident that the average ROAA in the emerging economies is almost 
three times higher than that in advanced economies. Furthermore, the ROAA in emerging 
banks increased gradually from 1.2 in 1999 to 1.8 in 2007, although it decreased significantly 
between 2007 and 2008. By contrast, the return on average assets for banks in advanced 
economies remains to be constant being around 0.5 till 2007. The main question in this 
respect one might want to address is that what explains such differences in bank profitability 
between two different markets? 
[Figure 1] 
One possible answer could be the market structure in these economies. In order to 
analyse market structure, we compute market share and market concentration for the 
abovementioned banks, which are presented in Figures 2, 3 and 4. Figure 2 displays the 
                                                             
2
 See Data Section for more information regarding bank selecting procedure 
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Lorenz Curve for market share
3
. The horizontal and vertical axes show the proportion of 
banks and market share respectively for both economies. As observed, 10 percent of 
emerging banks, which accounts for 23 banks, have nearly 40 percent of the market share. 
The same 10 percent of advanced banks accounting for 116 banks that amounts to as much as 
70 percent of market share. Figures 3 and 4 show the 4-firm concentration
4
 (     and 
normalized Herfindahl- Hirschman index
5
 (    ). The right-hand axes on each figure show 
the percentage of     and        respectively. It can be seen from Figure 3 that the degree 
of concentration (   ) in emerging market banking systems decreased dramatically from 
85% in 1999, to 67% in 2008. Conversely, in the advanced banking system, with the 
exception of some fluctuations between 2001 and 2006,    remains constant at around 51 
percent. Regarding    , again, it declined considerably in emerging economies during the 
period under consideration from 0.19 to 0.10, while in advanced economies, it increased 
significantly from nearly 0.05 in 1999 to 0.1 in 2008.  
In short, these figures illustrate that in general banks in emerging markets have a 
higher profit rate than banks in the developed markets. Although there has been a fall in the 
concentration in emerging economies, the structure is still highly concentrated at around 67% 
measured by     that can be very conductive to price collusion. We have motivated by these 
comparative illustrations to investigate further whether the high level of profits in emerging 
banks is indeed explained by market structure or other factors.   
The importance of our comparative study of bank behaviours between emerging 
economies and Western countries lies in the development and improvement of the banking 
sector in emerging economies.  For example, the improvement of the banking environment in 
the Middle East would provide more opportunities to enter into the international markets. For 
banks in the Former Eastern Europe, the legal and financial infrastructures need to be 
established in order to penetrate into the major EU markets.  The existence of geographically 
limited markets offers researchers the advantage of comparing profitability and concentration 
across markets, without the confounding influences of inter-industry differences. However, 
                                                             
3 In designing Lorenz Curve and measuring market share some of banks were dropped. For example number of 
emerging banks reduced from 308 to 234 due to missing observation 
4     is calculated as the total assets of four largest banks to the total assets of all banks in the country. 
5 If    represents the market shares by firm   and   is the number of firm in the market then    =      
  and 
    =
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there are some problems in comparing different regional banking sectors, such as different 
regulations (e.g. entry barriers, interest rate restrictions and credit ceilings) and the substantial 
differences in accounting practices and legal forms of banks in various parts of the world. 
Numerous studies have attempted to measure the determinants of bank profitability in 
the EU banking system, e.g. Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Girardone et al. 
(2004), Goddard et al. (2004b), Kosmidou et al. (2005), Athanasoglou et al. (2006) and 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008). Also, in the new global economy, there has been an increasing 
interest in measuring profitability in emerging markets, see e.g. Hassoune (2001) and Ben-
Khadiris (2009). However, studies of the profitability-market power relationship in emerging 
markets have been considerably less rigorous, lacking in detailed studies of the determinants 
of bank profitability.  This paper fills the gap by widening the scope in explanatory variables; 
not only market structure, but also other factors such as bank-specific characteristics, overall 
financial market performance and macroeconomic conditions, which systematically compare 
with those of advanced economies.  It is noted that another novelty in this paper is the 
investigation of the risk in baking sector, using the same explanatory variables applied to 
returns.  It is crucial to understand the causes of instability for, yet, unstable emerging banks.      
Different determinants call for different policy actions.  If profitability determinants 
can be effectively identified in relation to the market structure of developing countries, 
fundamental reform could be undertaken by central banks. If, on the other hand, determinants 
were dominated by bank-level variables, promoting more stakeholder power would be 
desirable. If determinants are clearly identified macroeconomic variables, actions in terms of 
bank reform would be undertaken by macroeconomic policy makers.  
 The main empirical findings are as follows.  As with many studies presented in the 
banking literature, we find a positive statistical relationship between profitability and market 
share in advanced economies: banking systems in developed countries are generally biased 
toward the RMP hypothesis. However, the data do not seem to support the effect of market 
structure on bank performance in emerging market banking systems. Bank-specific variables 
and financial structure seem to exert a significant effect on both types of banks; however, the 
effect of some of these variables alters by interacting with market power. In particular, higher 
interest rate spreads increase profitability and stability for both types of economies, however, 
for emerging banks this seems to be one of the key elements to increase their profitability 
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raising concerns on economies. The macroeconomics variables have a robust effect on banks’ 
profitability in advanced countries, but less so for emerging economies.    
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature 
review of related studies. Section 3 specifies the model for estimation and describes the 
variables used for this study.  Section 4 summarises the data descriptive statistics with the 
data sources. The empirical results are reported in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes and 
provides a number of policy implications. 
 
2.     Literature review 
The literature on the concentration–returns relationship adopts one of two broad approaches: 
the market power (MP) and the efficiency structure (ES) paradigms. In the MP paradigm, the 
direction of causality between concentration and profitability runs from the market structure 
of an industry to behaviour which affects its performance. A concentrated structure is 
conducive to the use of market power in ways that may enhance bank profitability. The ES 
paradigm, by contrast, sees the causality as running from individual firm efficiency to their 
market share and profitability.  Within the MP paradigm, as Berger (1995) emphasizes, two 
distinct approaches can be identified: the structure–conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, 
and the relative market power (RMP) hypothesis. Similarly, there are also two approaches 
within the ES paradigm: the X-efficiency and the scale-efficiency hypotheses. By adding a 
direct measure of efficiency, an extensive debate has been found over the market-power 
versus efficient-structure explanations of the returns-structure relationship. Berger (1995) 
finds some support for the RMP hypothesis, in which market share is positively related to 
profitability.  He also reports partial support for the X-efficiency approach.     
Most research into the determinants of bank performance, such as Bourke (1989) is 
based on the traditional SCP paradigm. The SCP or collusion hypothesis postulates that 
market structure influences the conduct or behaviour of firms through, for instance, pricing 
and investment policies, and this in turn influences corporate performance. Bourke (1989) 
found a positive relationship between market concentration and bank profitability in Europe, 
North America, and Australia. For European banking markets, Maudos and de Guevara 
(2004) found a statistically significant positive correlation between concentration and bank 
interest margins for the period 1993–2000. A positive relationship between concentration and 
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profitability was also reported by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) for banks throughout 
the world, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) for Europe and Short (1979) for Canada, Western 
Europe and Japan. By contrast, Smirlock (1985) reported that concentration does not explain 
bank profit rates for 2700 state banks operating in the USA. Also Goldberg and Rai (1996) 
fail to find a positive relationship between concentration and profitability for a sample of 
large banks located in 11 European countries for the period 1988–1991.  
There is also a considerable literature focusing for the single country studies for 
Colombia (e.g. Barajas et al., 1999), Malaysia (e.g. Guru et al., 1999), Italy (e.g. Girardone et 
al., 2004), Greek (e.g. Kosmidou and Pasiouras, 2005), Australia (e.g. Williams, 2003), UK 
(e.g. Kosmidou et al., 2005), Korea (e.g. Park and Weber, 2006),Hong Kong (e.g. Wong et 
al., 2007), Philippines (e.g. Sufian and Chong, 2008), China (e.g. Sufian and Habibullah, 
2009), and Turkey (e.g. Sayilgan and Yildirim, 2009). For the panel of countries, see also 
Goddard et al. (2004b); Beckman (2007); Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007); and Flamini et al. 
(2009). 
Some studies looked at other factors as determinants of bank profitability.  Kosmidou 
et al (2005), for example, analysed the UK commercial banking sector over the period 1995-
2002, reporting that the cost to income ratio, liquidity, and loan loss reserves affect 
profitability significantly. Capital adequacy appears to be one of the main determinants of 
bank profitability. In addition, they noted that macroeconomic factors such as inflation and 
GDP growth, and variables used as proxies of the relative development of the banking 
industry and the stock market, are positively associated with bank performance. Pasiouras 
and Kosmidou (2007) measured the effects of 10 internal and external variables on 
profitability, including the capital ratio, cost to income ratio, loans to customers and short-
term funding, bank size, inflation, GDP growth, concentration, and three determinants 
reflecting the development of banking and stock markets on bank returns for 584 domestic 
and foreign commercial banks in the 15 developed EU countries over the period 1995-2001. 
The effects of all variables are found to be significant, regardless of bank ownership status 
except for the concentration ratio.  
So far, the most comprehensive study of bank performance with the largest sample of 
countries was conducted by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). They measured the effects 
on profitability of a variety of bank and market characteristics, such as taxation, the structure 
of financial systems, and financial regulations. Using commercial bank-level data from 80 
9 
 
developed and developing countries over the period 1988-1995, they emphasised that banks 
with larger assets and/or lower concentration ratios are more profitable. They also reported 
that in developing countries, the domestic banks earn smaller profits than foreign ones, while 
the converse applies in developed countries. Furthermore, they find that banks with higher 
non-interest-earning assets tend to be less profitable; inflation and interest rate have a positive 
impact on profitability, particularly in developing countries. In their extended work in 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000) on financial structure and bank profitability among 
many developed and developing countries, they concluded that “greater bank development 
brings about tougher competition, higher efficiency and lower profits’’.                  
Using data from seven south eastern European countries over the period 1998-2002, 
Athanasoglou et al. (2006) reported statistically significant relationships between profitability 
and such determinants as capital, inflation, operating expenses, size, ownership status, and 
concentration, whereas they found no evidence to support the influence of liquidity risk and 
GDP per capita. Finally, one of the latest studies by Tregenna (2009) analysed the high 
profits of American banks in the pre-crisis period (1994-2005), where the effects of market 
structure, bank size and operational efficiency on profitability were investigated. The main 
finding was that efficiency does not affect profitability strongly; rather, a positive 
concentration-profit relationship was found. Tregenna (2009) argued that high profits before 
the crisis in the US banking sector were derived through concentration and not through 
efficient performance, suggesting that the rising profits were at the expense of efficient 
economy as a whole.  
Some of recent research attempts to explain the profit-efficiency relationship by 
introducing x-efficiency and scale-efficiency, while incorporating market power hypotheses. 
The methods they use to measure those efficiency indicators are the stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) and the data envelopment analysis (DEA). Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008), 
for example, investigated the determinants of bank interest margins in the Central and Eastern 
European countries. They attempted to determine empirically whether the high profit margins 
of banks in these transition economies are caused by a low degree of efficiency or non-
competitive market conditions. By employing the SFA techniques, they find that there is 
evidence to support the SCP hypothesis. Higher operational efficiency is reflected in lower 
bank interest margins in banking sectors in these countries. Seelanatha (2010) attempted to 
identify the influence of bank efficiency and market structure on bank profitability in Sri 
Lanka. By utilizing the DEA approach, a non-parametric approach, the findings suggest that 
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the performances of banks in Sir Lanka depend on levels of efficiency, but not on market 
power, in terms of either market share or market concentration.    
Finally, as Tregenna (2009) correctly points out, high profits in the banking sector 
cannot prevent banks themselves from bankruptcy, in the event of financial crisis, if such 
profits are derived from market share or market concentration, rather than through efficient 
performance. Although the current financial crisis has affected most Western countries and 
caused serious disturbances to the mature economy banking sectors, it has also constituted a 
useful warning to emerging banks to re-evaluate their positions. The crisis caused both banks 
and regulators to focus on cost reduction and efficiency improvement. In particular, a much 
stronger regulation of the banking sector in developing banking system is needed in order to 
balance returns and risks 
Overall, the existing literature provides a fairly comprehensive review of the effects 
of market power, financial structure, and bank activity determinants on bank risk and return 
in an individual country or panel of countries, but some questions in relation to emerging 
markets banking systems still need to be answered empirically. The results of previous 
studies usually indicate that the impact of market power on bank performance is positive, 
although such relationship could be spurious. There is no empirical evidence that bank 
structure exerts a significant influence on increasing profitability indicators in emerging 
economies. Yet, existing empirical literature does not focus specifically on market structure 
and bank risk and returns, nor control for the influence of pricing behaviour, regulation, and 
financial freedom on bank performance. This paper aims at addressing the above issues, in 
order to gain greater insight into the factors affecting bank performance in emerging 
economies.  
 
3.     The model specification and variable selection  
3.1     The model specification  
We develop a panel data model by building upon the existing empirical models in 
investigating key aspects of bank performance, measured by its risk and returns.  We, in 
particular, examine bank performance through the potential influence of market structure or 
market power. 
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Following Smirlock (1985) and Douglas and Diana (1988), the traditional hypothesis 
can be tested by estimating profit using the equation shown below: 
                          
where   denotes bank   and   stands for year  ,   measures bank performance, and market 
structure refers to either using market share (  ) at a firm level, or using the concentration 
ratio (  ) at the market level. The CR reflects the degree of collusive behaviour that a firm’s 
power to extract higher profits is due to oligopolistic behaviour. This model is based on the 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis and the relative-market-power (RMP) 
hypothesis. The expanded version is as follows: 
                                (1) 
where     is a measure of the 4-firm concentration ratio. Eq. (1) differentiates the two 
hypotheses, the SCP versus the RMP. Each coefficient yields a marginal effect of market 
structure on profitability in the banking system. A coefficient combination of      and 
     implies that banks with a high market share are more efficient than their rivals and 
yield higher profit. Some empirical evidence supports the RMP theory, in which the key 
element of market structure is market share. Conversely,      and     , suggest that the 
traditional SCP theory can be verified. This implies that firms’ greater profitability is not 
affected by market share; rather, rents arise from the monopolistic operation due to market 
concentration. 
Next, we consider the measures of X-efficiency and scale-efficiency to test the 
efficient-structure hypothesis (see Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008) together with other 
bank-specific variables. Due to a lack of data, we specify indirect measures of these 
efficiencies, such as the size of the bank as a proxy of scale-efficiency and overheads to total 
assets ratio as an overall measure of cost efficiency. Furthermore, the model is augmented 
with supplemented measures, which are particularly useful for providing a comprehensive 
understanding of the factors underlying a bank’s net margins and risk and the quality of bank 
management.   
Finally, in cross-country comparisons, it is necessary to allow for variation in country-
level variables, in which we recognize that profitability determinants can vary systematically 
across countries. These differences are potentially important for countries in transition.  
Country-specific factors, such as the level of economic development, and overall financial 
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structure, can have a significant effect on the level of profitability. Hence, we can estimate an 
equation of the following form for both emerging and advanced economies. 
                                      
 
   
 
   
                                
where    is a vector of bank-specific variables and    is a vector of country-specific and 
overall financial structure factors. Also,    is the error term with     being the unobserved 
individual-specific effect and     being the normal stochastic disturbance, where   ≈ 
   (0,  
 ) and    ≈    (0,  
 ).   
 
3.2.     Determinants and variable selection 
 Dependent variables 
We measure a bank’s returns by its returns on assets and equity. The profitability measures, 
after-tax return on average assets (ROAA) and after-tax return on average equity (ROAE), 
which indicate how effectively banks’ assets and equity are being managed to generate 
revenues, are standards in banking literature
6
. For the robustness check, we also employ an 
alternative measure of returns, which are the net interest margin and the Sharpe ratio. The 
latter is risk-adjusted returns on equity that is given by the mean value of the returns on 
equity divided by the standard deviation of the returns on equity. See, e.g. Kosmidou et al. 
(2005), Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007), and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) for the use 
of these variables.   
Our main measure of bank risk is the distance to default or Z-score, defined as the 
standard deviation value that a bank’s rate of return on assets has to fall for the bank to 
become insolvent
7
. It is calculated as mean of return on assets plus capital asset ratio divided 
by the standard deviation of the returns on asset. A higher Z score indicates that the bank is 
more stable. An alternative measure of bank stability, the interest coverage ratio (or interest 
multiplier), is also employed. We measure the interest coverage ratio, computed as profit plus 
interest expenses divided by interest expenses.  
                                                             
6
 In order to capture any differences that appear in assets during the fiscal year, averages are employed. 
7 It is worth mentioning that a more appropriate measure for bank risk would be a non-performing loans ratio, 
however, due to data limitations, no homogeneous proxy could be constructed for all banks. 
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 Market structure 
The first measure of market structure is market share, which is a measure of relative market 
power, calculated as the bank’s share of assets to total bank assets. It is expected that market 
share and bank profitability has a positive relationship. The concentration ratio, which 
provides estimates of the extent to which the largest firms contribute to activity in an 
industry, is taken as the second measure of market structure. Following Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2004), we measure bank-market concentration as the fraction of bank assets held by the four 
largest banks in a country. The degree of concentration of a market is expected to exert a 
negative influence on the degree of competition in the market.  
We verify the robustness of the results by applying an alternative measure of market 
concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (   ). The     equals the sum of the 
squared market shares of all the firms in the market, that is, if     represents the market 
shares by firm  ,    =      
 .
 8
   
 Bank-specific variables 
In addition to market structure, we include total of eight bank-specific control variables that 
have been shown to be instrumental in explaining bank profitability. Firstly, we consider 
interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate). This gauges the extent to which interest 
earning capacity of an entity exceeds or falls short of its interest cost obligations. We make a 
priori forecast of the positive influence of this variable on risk and returns. 
 The second variable considered in the model is a bank size.  According to Goddard et 
al. (2004b), a bank size can affect the profit positively through several channels due to the 
facts that banks with higher assets benefit from economies of scale and also larger banks may 
benefit from their market powers generating abnormal profits. We use total assets of the bank 
as a proxy for the bank size. Generally, the effect of a growing bank size on profitability has 
                                                             
8 In general, the     in a market with   equal-size firms is 
 
 
. Because of this property, the reciprocal of     is 
referred to as the number-equivalent of firms. There is also a normalised Herfindahl index. Since the Herfindahl 
index ranges from     to one the normalized Herfindahl index (    ) ranges from 0 to 1. It is computed as 
    =
     
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
, where again,   is the number of firms in the market, and     is the usual Herfindahl Index, as 
above. We also compute the statistical variance ( ) of the firm as  =
          
 
   
 
. 
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been proved to be positive to a certain extent, yet, for banks that become extremely large, this 
could turn into negative due to bureaucratic and inflexible operations. 
Thirdly, following many studies, the ratio of equity to total assets is employed as a 
measure of capital strength. In principle, all banks in our sample are subject to the Basel ІІ 
capital adequacy regulations: banks are required to hold at least 8% of capital against their 
risk weighted assets. Since well-capitalized banks face lower costs of funding and lower 
needs of external funding, thereby lower risk of bankruptcy, it is expected there will be a 
negative relationship between the equity to assets ratio and bankruptcy risk and a positive 
association with profitability (Pasiouras and Kosmidou 2007). Note also that capitalization is 
important to a bank’s operations in that it is the main source to cover loan losses, and also 
banks with more capital have more capability to develop business and deal with risks. Two 
positive effects of holding capital in excess of the regulatory minimum can be distinguished. 
First, when a bank benefits from free capital, it has the possibility of increasing its portfolio 
of risky assets. Second, when market conditions allow the bank to make additional loans with 
a beneficial return/risk profile, this will, ceteris paribus, increase the interest margin.  
Fourthly, the ratio of overheads to total assets is considered to provide information on 
variation in bank costs over the banking system. A negative correlation between overhead 
expenses and profitability and stability is expected, provided banks are efficiently operating 
at lower overheads. Note, however, that Molyneux and Thornton (1992), among others, 
empirically observe a positive relationship, arguing that high profits earned by firms may be 
appropriated in the form of higher payroll expenditures paid to more productive human 
capital.  Fifthly, off-balance-sheet activities to total assets ratio is another important variable 
to include in the model. Casu and Girardone (2005) point out that the European Union 
banking sector increasingly developed the non-traditional activities during the 1990s, and 
argue that the empirical study would lead to biased results without the role of off-balance 
sheet activities.  
In addition to the abovementioned variables, the loan growth is also specified to 
capture the impact of yearly growth of total loans on bank performance.  It is based on the 
argument that the rapid growth during a relatively short period is likely to yield relatively 
high profits. Finally, we examine the effects of bank age and foreign ownership status on 
bank risk and returns using dummy variables.  Using 7900 bank observations from 80 
countries over the period of 1988-1995, Claessens et al. (2001) report that domestic banks in 
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industrialized countries are more profitable than their counterparts in developing countries, 
but the opposite is the case for foreign banks, implying that the foreign banks are more 
profitable in emerging economies (see also Bush, 1997; and Bonin et al., 2005). 
Financial structure and macroeconomics 
Financial structure and macroeconomic factors are aggregate variables, which are also likely 
to influence risk and the rate of returns of individual banks. We specify three indicators of the 
financial structure of individual countries in the model. The first variable is domestic credit 
provided by the banking system (% of GDP), which includes all credit to various sectors on a 
gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government. A high ratio of bank credit 
to GDP, for instance, may reflect higher risk of default for banks. 
The second variable to capture the effect of financial structure on bank performance is 
the stock market turnover ratio
9
. Since the high ratio reflects more funds that come in and out 
of banking system and so more demand for bank services, we expect a positive relationship 
between turnover ratio and bank profitability. Note also that the high ratio indicates the 
efficiency of stock markets, and since efficient capital market discloses more information 
about companies, banks can benefit by reducing adverse selection and moral hazard risks, 
improving their profitability.  
The third variable is related to regulation on deposit insurance.  The dummy variable 
takes a value of 1, if there is deposit insurance scheme in place and 0 otherwise.  The 
traditional argument is that more generous deposit insurance weakens the market discipline 
enforced by depositors, and encourages banks to take greater risk arising moral hazard in 
banks (For further discussion see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).   
Finally, in order to control the macroeconomic environment in which the banks 
operate, we include inflation rate and real GDP growth as proxies for business cycle 
fluctuations. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) have shown that banks in inflationary 
environments have wider margin and greater returns. According to Bikker and Hu (2002) and 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008), GDP growth has a positive effect on banks’ profitability, possibly 
due to increases in lending rates with less probability of default rate.   However, the level of 
economic activity also affects the supply of funds, i.e. deposits, and if the elasticity of deposit 
                                                             
9 is the total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization for the period 
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supply is small due to a rise in consumption with the GDP growth, the expected sign on the 
coefficient is negative.    
 
4.     Data sources and descriptive analyses  
Data sources  
The primary source of data on the bank’s balance sheets and income statements is the 
BankScope database.
10
 The dataset in this study is supplemented by retrieving the country 
level data from the World Bank database.  
This paper uses several criteria to filter data. Firstly, banks must be active, as 
indicated by the BankScope by removing banks that were bankruptcy. Secondly, in order to 
enhance the quality of data and comparability across countries, we selected banks that have 
total assets of more than a billion USD. Also, these data are only from depository and non-
depository institutions involved in providing funds for industry, eliminating central banks and 
other non-banking financial institutions. Furthermore, any outliers are removed; particularly 
any values below the 1 percentage point and also above the 99 percentage point in its sample 
distribution were removed. This helps alleviate the problem arising from extreme outliers that 
affects estimation. 
The above procedure yielded an unbalanced panel data set of 1929 banks, including 
308 banks from emerging economies (122 banks in the Eastern Europe and 186 banks in the 
Middle East) and 1621 banks from Western Europe over the period 1999-2008, consisting of 
3080 and 16210 observations, respectively
11
. The data covers 10 Eastern European, 13 
Middle Eastern and 17 Western European countries.  The Middle East and the East Europe 
would appear to be a particularly appropriate choice for a study of market structure in 
emerging economies. The Middle Eastern banking system is fairly concentrated and, at least 
until the late 1990s, was tightly regulated and protected from foreign competition. Eastern 
Europe has recently converged with the European Union and follows the European monetary 
                                                             
10
 The database is produced by the Bureau van Dijk, which includes more than 12,000 banks around the world, 
accounting for about 90% of total assets in each country. 
11
  Banks included in the sample were eventually every bank which fell within the top 4500 banks in the world 
in winter 2010-2011, ranked by total assets. Furthermore, the sample covers approximately 65 % of the total 
assets for the whole of the EU banking system and 61 % of the total assets in all the Middle East countries. 
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rules. The Western banking system is also a good benchmark in which banks operate under a 
relatively highly competitive environment.   
Table 1 shows the variables with the expected effect on profitability and stability together 
with sources of data and countries included in the sample. 
[Table 1] 
Data descriptive analyses 
Table 2 demonstrates the degree of correlation amongst dependent and explanatory variables 
used in the multivariate regression analysis. The maximum correlation of 0.521 is found 
between the variables off-balance-sheet activities and equity to total asset.  The matrix shows 
that, in general, the correlation between the explanatory determinants is not strong, 
suggesting that potential multicollinearity problem is very limit.  
[Table 2 and 3] 
The comparative study on mean values of the dependent and explanatory variables are 
shown in Tables 3a, 3b and 3c  in terms of regional-wise, country-wise and the types of bank, 
respectively. Table 3a reports sample means by region, computed for bank-year observations.  
Comparing the statistics across regions, wider variations are observed in market structure, 
bank activity, overall financial structure, and macroeconomic variables. This particularly 
applies to the comparison between emerging banks versus advanced banks, whereas some of 
the mean values between Eastern Europe and Middle Eastern countries seem to be close to 
each other. It is remarkable to observe that the returns in emerging market banks is almost 
three times in ROAA (1.45) and twice in ROAE (13.27) of those in West European banks.  
The t-statistics for the mean equality for variables are mostly highly significant, confirming 
the wider degree of variations. Table 3b shows sample means by country-wise for the 
variables. The highest returns are found in Middle Eastern countries, e.g. Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and UAE.    
Table 3c compares the means and standard deviations (s.d.) of variables for the 
emerging and the advanced economies. Banks in emerging economies tend to exhibit higher 
values of s.d. than those in advanced economies, highlighting a somewhat volatile market, 
which is intuitively plausible. In terms of comparison between the commercial and non-
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commercial banks in the last column, the mean value of the ROAA and ROAE have shown to 
be larger in the commercial banks, indicating a higher profitability.   
[Table 4 ] 
Table 4 ranks countries in descending order of market growth, market structure, and 
bank profitability and stability indicators.  It is evident that Romania (36.44%), Iran (37.65%) 
and Finland (23.69%) have the highest market growth in the respective regions for the period 
1999-2008, whereas Slovakia (11.03%), Israel (6.67%) and Germany (5.35%) have the 
lowest market growth. In terms of the market structure, Estonia, with a 34.48% market share 
and Slovakia with a 84.04% 4-firm concentration ratio and Estonia with a 0.32 Herfindahl 
index, seem to have the most concentrated markets in Eastern Europe. Based on the same 
criteria, in Qatar at 93.25% and Jordan at 0.25 in the Middle East and Cyprus at 88.69% and 
Finland at 0.29 in Western Europe, the markets tend to be more concentrated.  Estonia and 
Qatar show the highest values in ROAE, at the same time, they indicate the highest Z-scores, 
suggesting that both countries enjoy a high profitability with stable banking systems as 
compared with other banks located in the same regions. Malta seems to follows the same with 
the highest Z-score amongst other Western European countries, though it comes to the second 
in ROAA and ROAE.   
 
5.     Estimation results 
In order to examine cross-section variation, Eq. (2) is estimated through the fixed effects 
regressions. The fixed model is estimated using the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) 
procedure, while the random effect model is estimated using the Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS) procedure. The potential for using the fixed effect, rather than the random effects 
model, can be tested with the Hausman test. The fixed/random effect approach is supported 
by the absence of heteroscedasticity based on the Breusch-Pagan test in the residual from our 
estimated model, indicating that the variance of each model’s residuals is equal across banks.  
Evaluation of bank returns and market structure 
[Table 5] 
Table 5 reports the empirical estimations of Eq. (2) for a bank’s ROAA in panel A and bank’s 
ROAE in panel B, in which profitability (Π) is regressed on market structure, bank-specific 
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characteristics, financial structure, and macroeconomic variables for banking systems in both 
emerging and advanced economies separately. The regressions include bank fixed effects and 
clustering of the errors at the bank level.  
Note that we included the interaction terms to investigate whether interest rate spread, 
bank age, ownership status, and/or regulation have an independent effect on bank returns or 
whether their effect is channelled through the market power possessed by banks. However, 
since the interaction terms are highly collinear with their respective components, we run 
regressions without the interaction terms in models 1, 3, 5, and 7, and without the relevant 
individual components but with the interaction terms in models 2, 4, 6, and 8. 
The explanatory power of the model is relatively high for banks in emerging economies in 
Panel A. The F-statistic for all models is significant at the 1% level. These results imply that 
additional factors may influence the profitability of banks in advanced economies. 
For all regressions, the market share coefficients are positive, but statistically significant at 
the 5% level only for advanced markets. The coefficients of market concentration are not 
statistically significant for advanced economies, but we find significant negative coefficients 
for emerging economies. It is evident that in advanced economies market share seems to 
dominate market concentration, in other words, the relative-market-power (RMP), rather than 
the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, is supported for advanced 
banking systems. The failure to support the SCP hypothesis is inconsistent with much of 
existing literature, which reports a positive and statistically significant market concentration 
coefficient for developed banking systems.  Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008), for instance, 
argue that the SCP hypothesis is adhered to Western European banks. Vennet (2002) also 
obtained the supporting evidence for European banks in the 1990s. Moreover, Maudos and de 
Guevara (2004) found positive and statistically significant correlation between market 
concentration and bank interest margins for the period 1993–2000 for European banking 
systems. In a major survey, Gilbert (1984) reported that of 44 studies on the US banking 
industry, 32 were found to support the traditional hypothesis of the existence of collusive 
profits. However, in line with our results, Goldberg and Rai (1996) did not find a positive 
relationship between market concentration and profitability for a sample of large banks 
located in 11 European countries for the period 1988–1991.  The insignificant relationship 
found in this paper may, in part, be explained in Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) that higher 
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market concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks located in the 
Euro area for the period 1993–1999.     
In the emerging market banking systems, given an insignificant coefficient of market 
share, market power does not seem to be the key factor in enabling banks to earn a relatively 
high rate of return.  We have a significant, but a negative coefficient of market concentration.  
Although, it is an unexpected sign, this seems to be consistent with Fig. (1), where the 
profitability had an upward trend in contrast to the market concentration that had a downward 
trend. This may indicate that with increasing competition to reduce the market concentration 
the regulatory authorities lift more constraints on large banks to peruse their business, in 
particular, policy interest rate.              
With respect to bank-specific characteristics, all of the coefficients are significant in 
either type of with or without interaction term models, except for the off-balance-sheet 
activities in emerging markets. The main finding is that the variable of interest rate spread is 
well-determined in the profitability indicators (ROAA and ROAE) with the correct positive 
sign for both emerging and advanced economies. The magnitude of the coefficients are 
slightly higher in banks operating in emerging economies, indicating that these banks tend to 
adjust more interest rates in order to raise profits. Its’ interaction with market power enters 
with a negative coefficient, which implies that lower interest rate spreads raise bank returns, 
as banks gain more market power in emerging economies. Possibly, this implies that an 
increasing market share allows banks to lower the spreads, while increasing their 
profitability. The reverse situation occurs in the case of advance economies, where the 
coefficients on the interaction term is positive, indicating that as banks expand their market 
share, an opportunities to raise the spreads arises to increase their profit.     
The assets variable enters with a negative and significant coefficient for emerging 
economies, but with a positive coefficient for advanced economies. This contrasting result 
suggests that larger banks have lower rates of return for developing economies but have 
higher rates of return for advanced economies. The result for emerging economies may 
reflect the scale inefficiencies in large banks, and explain the negative impact on profitability 
of the market concentration constituted by four largest banks.  These results support the 
studies that reported either economies of scale and scope for smaller banks, or diseconomies 
for larger financial institutions, although the theory provides conflicting predictions about 
optimal bank asset structures.    
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The relatively high and significant coefficients of equity to total assets and overheads 
to total assets with the expected positive and negative signs, respectively, demonstrate that 
capital strength and overhead expenses appear to be the robust determinants of bank 
profitability. The finding that a high capital adequacy increases ROAA and ROAE is 
consistent with previous studies (see e.g. Kosmidou, 2007 and Athanasoglou et al., 2008), in 
support of the argument that well capitalized banks face lower costs of external funding, 
resulting in the higher profitability.  
Furthermore, controlling for all other relevant factors, the coefficient on the off-
balance-sheet activities is statistically significant only for the advanced markets banking 
systems.  With a negative sign, it is associated with lower returns. This conflicts with 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010): using data for 1,334 banks in 101 countries over the 
1995-2007 periods, who found that expansion into fee income (non-interest income) 
increases the rate of return on assets, and it could offer some risk diversification benefits. The 
insignificant coefficient for emerging markets may reflect too little operation of the off-
balance activities in banks to determine its effect.   
Market growth, measured as real growth of total loans in the bank’s markets, appears 
to be another important determinant for both economies; the fast-growing banking market 
tends to have a market environment that is in favour of every bank to gain higher returns. The 
effect of bank age is highly significant, but the signs are opposite for emerging economies 
and advanced economies. Older banks in emerging countries are more profitable, compared 
to their counterparts in advanced economies. It is, however, noteworthy; that when bank age 
interacts with market share in ROAE, Model 6 and 8 show that older banks have higher 
returns, irrespective of their economies.   
We also find that foreign banks in emerging economies seem to earn greater profits, 
whereas their counterparts in advanced economies earn fewer profits. Yet, the real impact of 
bank ownership status on returns still depends on its market power in advanced markets; in 
Model 8, the variable of the interaction between ownership and market share yields a positive 
coefficient suggesting that foreign banks with a substantial market power are more profitable. 
Our finding implies that foreign banks enter to the emerging market do not enhance 
competition, but new technology and services that helps them increase spread in favour of 
raising more profits. In contrast, foreign banks does intensify competition in developed 
markets, which reduce profitability overall.  
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Turning to financial structure and macroeconomic variables, we again tend to find 
different results between emerging and advanced economies. While there is a highly 
significant relationship between domestic credit provided by the banking sector and 
profitability, the coefficients have the opposite sign of negative and positive. This indicates 
that in the emerging markets, scarcity of fund supply becomes a key constraint on 
competition growth. The more funds available on market, the high competition will be, and 
so to increase competitive pressure on banks to provide competitive services. 
Stock market turnover ratio is positively related to bank profitability based on the 5% 
significance level. Since increasing efficiency in stock markets should contribute to revealing 
more information, making the process of selection and monitoring of borrowers easier for 
banks, this should improve a bank’s interest margin and profitability.  Hence, other things 
being equal, the complementary relationship is formulated between the development of 
banking systems and the stock markets.  
The variable of regulation is statistically significant only for banks in emerging 
markets with a negative sign, implying that the regulation through the deposit insurance 
scheme exert a detrimental impact on returns. The generous deposit regulation in 
combination with market power also reduces bank profitability for banks located in advanced 
economies. Furthermore, the effects of inflation and GDP growth on bank profitability are 
negative and positive respectively for advanced economies; lower rate of inflation and high 
GDP growth are associated with higher returns in matured banks.   
The dummy variables are used for the different types of banks, where all bank types 
are in comparison with the counterpart of commercial banks, except for Middle East that is 
compared with Easter Europe.  It is observed that investment banks generate higher returns 
on assets than do commercial banks, being applicable to both economies. Islamic banks tend 
to be more profitable than commercial banks when the profitability is gauged by ROAE.  
Real estate and savings banks in advanced banking systems are less profitable, while the 
reverse is true in emerging economies. Banking systems operating in Middle East appear to 
perform better than those in the Eastern Europe.  
Evaluation of bank stability and market structure 
We consider how a bank’s Z-score and interest coverage ratio are related to the market 
structure and other determinants of bank performance. Table 6 presents the regressions of the 
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Z-score in panel A and the interest coverage ratio in panel B, for both emerging and advanced 
markets banking systems. All explanatory variables in both panel regressions are fully 
analogous to the rate of return regressions in Table 5, except for the fact that one period lag 
of equity to total assets is specified in order to avoid direct accounting relationship between 
capital and the Z-score. The estimation is by ordinary least squares (OLS) by taking fixed 
effect with a clustering of the errors at the bank level.  
[Table 6] 
Both the Z-score and the interest coverage ratio are positively and significantly related 
to market share, suggesting that a greater market share increases bank stability. By contrast, 
the effect of market concentration on the Z-score is significantly negative only in advanced 
economies, meaning that concentrated markets pose some risk in matured banks.    
Given many significant coefficients, it is evident that the variables of the Z-score and 
the interest coverage ratio are closely related to bank-specific factors. With a positive sign on 
the coefficient of interest rate spread, banks operating in both types of economies seem to 
become more stable as the spread widens. Bank size, proxies by the total assets; however, 
does not appear to improve bank stability. As expected, a high capital ratio is found to 
contribute to bank stability, being consistent with theory.  Higher overheads are positively 
related to the Z-score, yet negatively related to the interest coverage for both economies.  It is 
interesting to find that the former implies that banks with higher overheads are more stable 
when the stability is measured by the Z-score. Banks, which focus on generating profits 
through off-balance-sheet activities, tend to have less risk in both emerging and advanced 
economies, albeit the coefficients in the Z-score are insignificant in emerging banks.  Note 
that in Table 5, we find a negative impact of off-balance-sheet business on the returns in 
advanced banks, but this new finding in Table 6 indicates that the variable appears to present 
banks with a trade-off between risk and returns. 
The positive sign on the coefficients of the market growth indicates that the variable 
serves to provide a preferable effect on the banks’ stability. The bank age appears to matter in 
emerging economies, where older banks are more stable compared to younger banks, which 
is intuitively plausible for the less developed markets.  Notably, the bank age effect seems to 
be channelled through the market share in Model 2.  By contrast, given the insignificant 
coefficients the bank age does not seem to alter the degree of stability in advanced countries’ 
banks. The increasing presence of foreign banks in the economy exerts a positive impact on 
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bank stability for both economies, which would be strengthened with their increasing market 
power (see the interaction terms in Model 2, 4, 6 and 7).  
In terms of the effect of financial structure, the sign on the significant coefficients is 
the same as in the case of profitability regressions in Table5.  An increase in releasing 
domestic credit causes to lower profitability and stability in emerging economies, but the 
reverse is the case in advanced economies. Again, this is perhaps due to the fact that un-
matured banks tend to invest in risky investment projects or release funds to lower quality 
borrowers with a lack of adequate screening and monitoring systems in place. The stock 
turnover ratio enters with the positive coefficients, indicating that stock market efficiency is 
one of the factors for the bank stability.  Bank stability is positively associated with the index 
of bank regulatory power for advanced economies, whereas it is negatively for emerging 
economies.  Given the fact that the negative coefficient is also found for bank profitability in 
Table 5, the deposit insurance regulation has little contribution for the sound operations in 
emerging banks.  However, note that when it is interacted with market power in Model 2 and 
6, at least it will reveal a desirable impact on emerging banks.  This could indicate that bank 
regulations in reducing bank risk depend on market power of banks and perhaps the 
economic environment, where the banking systems are operated. It manifests itself that 
ignoring such interactions as the one between regulation and market power leads to erroneous 
inference about the impact of regulations on bank risk.  
 The macroeconomics variables seem to significantly impact on the bank risk, which 
was not found for the returns for emerging banks.  The stability improves when the country 
experience high GDP growth in a deflationary period. Finally, the dummy variables for 
different types of banks are, in general, insignificant. It appears that there is little difference 
in terms of bank stability between commercial banks versus other types of banks. The 
exception is for the Middle East versus Eastern Europe banks. It reveals that the Middle 
Eastern banking systems are more stable than their counterparts in the Eastern Europe.   
 Robustness tests    
The findings from these regressions remained to some extend robust, albeit with minor 
variation, to a number of alternative ways we ran the regressions. Specifically, we tried i) 
including normal Herfindahl index (    ) instead of 4-firm concentration ii) adding more 
explanatory variables than previous studies, namely, personnel expenses to size, square of 
bank size, cost to income ratio, and stock market capitalization, iii) decomposing non-
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commercial banks to investment, co-operative, savings and Islamic banks, iv) including a 
one-period lag of explanatory variables, such as a capital adequacy lag, and interest rate 
spread lag, v) using net interest margin and the Shape ratio instead of ROAA and ROAE, and 
vi) removing investment, Islamic, and real estate banks one by one from the sample, which 
may have different objectives amongst themselves. None of these alternative approach 
yielded significant different results. For brevity, the results are not presented here, but are 
available from the authors upon request.   
Discussion of the key findings  
The empirical results found in this section support the view that greater market power leads 
to higher bank profit rates in advanced economies, however, it cannot explain the high bank 
returns among emerging markets, at least during the period under consideration, failing to 
address our key question of why bank profitability indicators in emerging economies are high 
in relation to market structure. There are some possible reasons we should emphasize based 
on the data and empirical results in other variables. Firstly, we can argue that as the number 
of banks in a market increases, the profitability indicators decrease significantly, irrespective 
of the efficiency of the banking system. High entry barriers and restrictions on foreign banks 
facilitate market collusion, with the consequence that even markets with low concentration 
may exhibit collusive behaviour, raising the profits of existing banks. In other words, market 
competitiveness depends on the number of participants. For example, in Eastern Europe 
countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic that have a relatively large number of banks 
in their respective markets, the profitability ratio is low. Similarly, in mature economies, the 
German banking system has the largest number of banks, while the profitability indicators are 
the lowest. 
  Another possible answer would be the high interest rate margins – the spread between 
bank interest earnings and expenses as a percentage of interest-earning assets – which vary 
widely across markets, and remain substantially high as compared with those in advanced 
economies.  The average interest rate spread (average lending rate minus deposit rate) among 
emerging economies is also significantly high: on average, financial institutions in emerging 
economies have a mean interest rate spread of 6.09 percent, compared to 3.55 percent for 
advanced economies. The spread is widely regarded as an indicator of the efficiency of 
financial intermediation.  Hence the high interest rate spreads are an impediment to financial 
intermediation, as they discourage potential savers due to low returns, and increase financing 
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costs for borrowers, reducing investment and growth opportunities. This is of particular 
concern for countries in transition, where financial systems are largely bank-based. Our 
finding of the positive significant coefficient on the interest rate spread in emerging banking 
systems implies that the price of bank products is not favourable for customers, but for banks, 
so that banks can earn more profits through increasing interest margin revenues in a non-
competitive financial market.  
 
6.      Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper empirically investigates the effects of market structure, bank-specific 
characteristics, overall financial structure and macroeconomic environment on profitability 
and stability of 308 banks in emerging economies and 1621 banks in advanced economies 
during the period of the ‘fat’ years, 1999-2008 when banks enjoyed very high profits. In 
particular, we assessed the extent to which the relatively high profitability in emerging 
banking systems can be attributed to non-competitive market conditions and/or pricing 
behaviour.  
Our results show clearly that there are large differences in profitability among the 
banks in our sample, and that a significant amount of this variation can be explained by the 
factors included in our analysis. We find that market share has no significant impact on bank 
profitability in emerging markets, providing no evidence in support of the RMP hypothesis, 
whereas we find evidence to support the hypothesis in advanced economy banking systems. 
More importantly, it is found that market power not only influences bank performance 
directly, but also indirectly by interacting with other key determinants. Through substantial 
market power, bank age, bank ownership status and regulation (deposit insurance) are 
associated with more stable banking system in emerging countries. We also find that market 
concentration negatively affect profitability in emerging banks. The support of the SCP 
hypothesis is also failed in this respect. However, given that, being specific to emerging 
economies, smaller banks are found to earn higher profits, whereas larger banks are found to 
earn lower profits, our result is not implausible.   
The main findings for other determinants of bank performance can be summarized as 
follows. Both a bank’s rate of return and its stability increase with its interest rate spreads, 
and are promoted with a high capital ratio. Trade-offs between risk and return are observed in 
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relation to the off-balance-sheet activities in advanced economies. We also find the scale 
efficiencies in smaller banks and its inefficiencies among large banks in emerging economies.  
Finally, bank’s profitability and stability appear to move in line with stock market 
developments.   
These findings have several implications for policy makers in emerging economies.  
Given the small number of banks and high interest rate spread in emerging economies, profits 
are derived from the fact that higher prices are imposed on borrowers and lenders in a less 
competitive environment, i.e. the profitability is the product of social inefficiency at a cost to 
the remainder of the economy. Thus, policy makers should remove unnecessary restrictions 
and entry barriers in establishing new private banks, and also provide conditions in which 
foreign banks are encouraged to enter the market. It is noteworthy that mostly the 
coefficients’ magnitude of bank-specific variables is larger in emerging economy banks than 
those in counterpart. This re-emphasises the important role of policy makers in ensuring that 
profits are consistent in the face of economic fluctuations. Also, bank managers in emerging 
economies should undertake the necessary measures to enhance the role of capitalization, and 
to create efficient cost control and liquidity, in order to further increase bank’s profitability 
and stability.  
Another implication of this study is that both banks and regulatory agencies should focus 
more on how to improve efficiency and less on market share or market concentration. 
Although, during the period under study, there was a significant decrease in the market 
concentration of emerging banks (recall Fig. 3), further reduction is still needed. During the 
period 1999 to 2008, the composition of businesses in banking industries in emerging 
economies changed radically, but still maintained relatively high concentration ratios 
compared to the Western countries. Clearly, an important policy implication is that antitrust 
or regulatory action may indeed be stressed. Changes in banking concentration ratios should 
occur for a variety of ways, including merger activity, deregulation, globalisation, 
nationalisation, privatisation, new products and technologies, production efficiency, 
restructuring and so on. In short, since the SCP hypothesis dominates in the advanced market 
banking system, antitrust enforcement would be socially beneficial, and since the RMP 
hypothesis dominates in the emerging market banking systems, policies that penalize or 
impair mergers would be socially costly.  
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Table 1     Variables, units, expected effect, source of data and sample countries 
Variables Units Expected 
effect on 
returns 
Expected 
effect on risk 
Source 
Profitability Indicators     
Return on average assets before tax (ROAA) Ratio -- -- BankScope 
Return on average equity before taxes (ROAE) Ratio -- -- BankScope 
Z-score Ratio -- -- BankScope 
Interest Coverage Ratio [(profit + interest expenses)/interest expenses] Ratio -- -- BankScope 
Market Structure     
Market share Ratio Positive Positive BankScope 
4-firm concentration ratio Ratio Positive Positive BankScope 
Bank-specific Characteristics     
Interest rate spread Percentage Positive Positive BankScope 
Size of bank  Logarithm ? ? BankScope 
Equity to total assets Ratio Positive Positive BankScope 
Overheads to total assets Ratio Negative Negative BankScope 
Off-balance-sheet activity to total assets Ratio ? ? BankScope 
Market growth (total assets) Ratio ? ? BankScope 
Bank age Dummy ? ? BankScope 
Ownership  Dummy ? ? BankScope 
Financial Structure      
Domestic credit provided by banking system (% of GDP) Ratio ? ? World Bank 
Stock market turnover ratio Ratio Positive Positive World Bank 
Regulation Dummy ? ? Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali and 
Laeven (2005) 
Macroeconomics     
Inflation Percentage ? ? World Bank 
GDP growth Percentage ? ? World Bank 
Countries Included     
Emerging economies:  
Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech –Rep, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
Middle East: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi, Syria, Turkey, UAE 
Advanced economies: 
Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,   Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
UK 
 
- ROAA is return on average assets, which is defined as profit before tax as a percentage of total assets of a bank.  
- ROAE is return on average equity, which is defined as profit before tax as a percentage of equity of a bank.  
- Z-score is defined as [(ROAA+CAR)/SROAA], where ROAA is return on average assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio, and 
SROAA stands for standard deviation of return on assets.  
- Interest coverage ratio (or interest multiplier) is defined as profit plus interest expenses divided by interest expenses.  
- Market share is the share of a bank’s assets to total assets in the market. 4-firm market concentration is the share of 4 largest bank 
assets to total assets in the market. Interest rate spread is the difference between lending and deposit rates.  
- Log (total assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars. Equity to total asset is the capital to asset ratio, which is defined 
as equity as a percentage of total assets.  
- Overheads is defined as total overhead costs as a share of total assets.  
- Off-balance-sheet activities are assets or debts that do not appear on a company's balance sheet as a percentage of total assets.  
- Market growth is the inflation-adjusted growth rate of bank total loans.  
- Bank age is the established year of a bank.  
- Domestic credit is domestic credit provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP.  
- Stock market turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization for the 
period. It is a measure of stock market efficiency.  
- Financial Regulation measures deposit insurance from Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) that takes a value of 1 if the country 
has an explicit deposit insurance scheme and 0 otherwise.  
- Inflation is the inflation rate based on consumer prices.  GDP growth is the inflation-adjusted growth rate of gross domestic product of 
the country.  
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Table 2     Correlation matrix for variables  
Correlation Probability ROAA ROAE Z-score Interest Cov. 
Ratio 
Market 
share 
4_firm 
concentration 
Interest rate  
spread 
Log(total 
assets) 
Equity to 
total assets 
Overheads to 
total assets 
Off-balance-
sheet activity 
to total assets 
Market 
growth 
(loans) 
Bank age Foreign banks Domestic 
credit 
Stock market 
turnover ratio 
Regulation Inflation 
ROAE 0.816***                  
Z-score 0.416*** 0.303***                 
 
Interest Cov.Ratio 0.725*** 0.731*** 0.328***                
 
Market share 0.283*** 0.244*** 0.215*** 0.298***               
 
4_firm concentration 0.343*** 0.209*** 0.342*** 0.326*** 0.274***              
 
Interest rate  spread 0.117\*** 0.090*** -0.015 -0.095*** -0.008 -0.014             
 
Log(total assets) 0.110*** 0.105*** 0.049*** 0.338*** 0.235*** 0.071*** -0.261***            
Equity to total assets 0.645*** 0.234*** 0.271*** 0.373*** 0.073*** 0.309*** 0.086*** 0.033*           
Overheads to total assets  0.132*** -0.043** 0.025 -0.347*** -0.141*** -0.048*** 0.446*** -0.526*** 0.302***          
 
Off-balance-sheet activities  0.538*** 0.291*** 0.380*** 0.378*** 0.147*** 0.362*** -0.060*** 0.116*** 0.521*** 0.093***         
Growth of total loans  0.335*** 0.302*** 0.264*** 0.351*** 0.160*** 0.236*** -0.122*** 0.165*** 0.186*** -0.112*** 0.299***        
Bank age  0.057*** 0.027 0.067*** 0.092*** 0.035* 0.144*** -0.118*** 0.265*** 0.044** -0.082*** 0.077*** 0.051***       
Foreign banks 0.059*** 0.105*** 0.029 0.185*** 0.204*** 0.039** -0.145*** 0.345*** -0.106*** -0.235*** 0.039** 0.092*** 0.111***      
 
Domestic credit  -0.109*** -0.023 0.092*** 0.027 -0.203*** -0.072*** -0.065*** -0.081*** -0.166*** -0.067*** -0.019 0.083*** 0.058*** 0.010     
Stock market turnover 
ratio  0.028 0.002 0.034* 0.090*** 0.005 0.026 -0.003 0.302*** 0.060*** -0.168*** 0.038** 0.016 0.072*** 0.079*** -0.019    
Regulation  -0.053*** -0.043** -0.048*** -0.090*** -0.390*** -0.111*** -0.036* -0.042** -0.023 0.044** -0.002 -0.055*** 0.014 0.005 0.062*** 0.007   
Inflation  0.261*** 0.130*** -0.114*** 0.274*** 0.138*** 0.351*** -0.077*** 0.328*** 0.269*** -0.123*** 0.211*** 0.170*** 0.105*** 0.135*** -0.137*** 0.210*** -0.057***  
GDP growth  0.212*** 0.205*** 0.304*** 0.232*** 0.117*** 0.335*** -0.013 0.083*** 0.118*** -0.075*** 0.168*** 0.199*** 0.011 0.076*** -0.065*** 0.041** 0.029 0.157*** 
 
This table shows the correlations between the main variables.  
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
34 
 
Table3a     Descriptive statistics and tests of means of dataset – by region averages over 1999-2008 
 
 
ROAA ROAE Z-score 
Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
Market 
share 
4 Firms 
concentra
tion 
Interest 
rate 
spread Log(size) 
Equity to 
total 
assets 
Overhead
s to size 
Off-
balance-
sheet 
activities 
Market 
growth 
(loans) 
Domestic 
Credit 
Stock 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Regulatio
n Inflation 
 
 
 
GDP 
growth 
Eastern European banks                   
         Mean 1.29 13.13 1.64 82.31 11.20 77.79 6.22 14.54 0.09 0.03 0.18 21.75 51.16 104.71 1.0 4.42 4.60 
         No. of observation  880 823 880 734 893 1076 754 892 861 856 687 626 1017 1139 1220 1032 1178 
Middle Eastern banks                  
         Mean 1.55 13.36 2.13 123.42 8.66 74.40 5.96 15.09 0.10 0.02 0.27 14.88 77.54 49.44 0.39 3.08 4.91 
         No. of observation  1350 1305 1350 678 1690 1792 1056 1448 1241 1424 1302 1118 1662 1536 1860 865 1226 
Total Emerging market banks                  
         Mean 1.45 13.27 1.94 102.05 9.63 75.67 6.22 14.88 0.09 0.02 0.24 17.35 67.53 72.97 0.63 3.81 4.76 
         No. of observation  2230 2128 2230 1412 2336 2868 1813 2340 2102 2260 1989 1744 2679 2675 3080 1897 2404 
West European banks                  
         Mean 0.43 6.65 1.03 53.49 1.32 51.64 3.55 15.07 0.06 0.02 0.10 6.74 129.88 105.47 0.99 2.10 2.13 
         No. of observation  11540 11251 11540 10061 11648 14133 10397 11502 11427 11440 9998 9530 15762 15344 16210 16206 16070 
Tests of means (t-statistics)                  
Western vs. Eastern Europe -36.59*** -27.32*** -25.95*** -12.16*** -45.35*** -56.78*** -17.72*** 11.35*** -28.03*** -31.11*** -16.96*** -32.88*** 108.01*** 0.50 -3.49*** -69.98*** -48.23*** 
Western vs. Middle East Europe -53.22*** -34.52*** -51.69*** -27.81*** -42.28*** -62.36*** -11.99*** -0.51 -39.00*** -3.90*** -42.56*** -22.97*** 79.66*** 40.28*** 133.75*** -27.30*** -54.62*** 
Eastern Europe vs. Middle East -4.81*** -0.61 -10.43*** -10.12*** 4.89*** 6.83*** 16.36*** -9.48*** -3.78*** 18.83*** 9.53*** 9.34*** -19.22*** 28.88*** 43.44*** 11.56*** -3.35*** 
Advanced vs. Emerging economies -57.48*** -41.45*** -3.35*** -26.70*** -52.69*** -81.26*** -10.78*** 6.20*** -45.27*** -20.31*** -41.44*** -35.31*** 117.26*** 29.41*** 85.33*** -50.85*** -68.62*** 
 
This table shows summary statistics of the main variables in different economies. It also reports the tests of means.  
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table3b     Descriptive statistics of dataset by country averages over 1999–2008 
 
 
Country 
 
No. of 
Banks 
Bank Performance Bank Concentration Bank-specific Variables Financial Structure Macroeconomics 
ROAA ROAE Z-score Interest 
Cov. Ratio 
Market 
Share 
4 Firms 
Concentratio
n 
Interest 
Spread 
Log(size) Equity to 
Total Assets 
Overheads to 
Total Assets 
    Off-
balance-
sheet 
activities  
Market 
Growth 
(Loans) 
Domestic 
Credit 
Stock 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Regulation Inflation GDP Growth 
East European Countries 
Bulgaria 11 1.87 15.63 1.97 113.65 11.63 80.08 6.49 13.53 0.12 0.04 0.127 27.99 49.38 63.09 1.00 5.62 5.31 
Czech–Rep 20 1.00 13.02 1.40 85.47 6.49 80.80 4.77 14.84 0.07 0.02 0.178 17.81 48.83 63.53 1.00 2.91 3.91 
Estonia 3 1.61 16.78 3.77 127.87 34.48 - 5.21 14.79 0.09 0.03 0.176 24.23 60.49 82.51 1.00 4.01 7.39 
                   
Hungary 14 1.16 13.59 1.59 70.89 9.52 74.27 4.41 15.09 0.08 0.03 0.330 23.09 60.92 107.64 1.00 6.35 3.59 
Latvia 8 1.57 15.11 2.12 113.47 16.39 83.01 6.27 13.92 0.09 0.03 0.116 27.80 67.83 99.37 1.00 3.98 7.22 
Lithuania 4 1.00 11.65 2.72 62.63 25.64 - 6.66 13.94 1.00 0.03 0.118 26.74 49.39 70.14 1.00 2.09 5.71 
                   
Poland 25 1.33 12.91 1.42 75.36 7.63 70.65 7.23 15.03 0.09 0.03 0.170 20.96 40.69 114.18 1.00 3.22 4.20 
Romania 13 1.65 11.66 1.68 77.62 10.20 82.13 10.36 14.24 0.12 0.04 0.171 26.43 38.31 87.53 1.00 7.06 5.09 
Slovakia 11 0.95 13.80 1.45 62.08 11.90 84.04 6.07 14.65 0.08 0.03 0.183 14.21 51.50 92.66 1.00 5.16 4.54 
Slovenia 13 1.09 10.59 1.25 77.63 9.43 74.09 4.69 14.44 0.09 0.03 0.235 21.39 58.37 92.41 1.00 5.43 4.43 
Middle Eastern Countries 
Bahrain 15 1.63 14.52 1.92 179.37 8.47 82.75 6.83 15.06 0.11 0.02 0.169 15.46 60.27 29.82 1.00 1.81 5.99 
Egypt 24 0.86 9.37 0.83 39.67 4.52 66.29 7.75 14.53 0.08 0.02 0.178 9.35 99.94 131.30 0.00 4.64 4.88 
Iran 15 1.57 13.79 1.27 122.05 8.77 77.68 8.73 15.20 0.07 0.02 0.315 25.46 47.33 55.27 0.00 - 5.78 
                   
Israel 11 0.47 8.37 2.15 50.70 9.52 85.17 5.13 16.04 0.05 0.02 0.310 6.26 80.28 31.76 0.00 2.19 3.79 
Jordan 9 1.22 11.34 2.09 116.73 11.11 91.56 6.36 14.88 0.10 0.02 0.274 12.88 97.29 35.88 1.00 2.78 6.02 
Kuwait 14 2.28 16.12 3.47 159.23 11.11 80.00 7.42 15.43 0.12 0.02 0.181 16.82 78.03 26.48 0.00 2.51 2.62 
                   
Lebanon 18 0.83 12.55 2.71 120.29 7.41 59.35 5.93 14.91 0.07 0.01 0.078 11.02 180.57 27.65 1.00 - - 
Oman 8 2.24 14.90 3.38 164.04 14.08 83.52 4.47 14.21 0.13 0.02 0.346 13.76 39.02 18.59 1.00 1.55 3.72 
Qatar 7 2.38 19.51 4.20 163.42 16.95 93.25 6.97 14.86 0.13 0.01 0.411 18.97 41.48 29.64 0.00 3.35 5.60 
                   
Saudi Arabia 11 2.33 18.61 3.57 179.10 10.10 66.00 4.08 16.38 0.11 0.02 0.231 15.73 58.15 23.31 0.00 2.58 3.42 
Syria 5 0.38 7.51 0.16 159.17 20.83 99.38 7.09 14.50 0.07 0.01 0.350 20.52 33.98 38.07 0.00 4.04 3.89 
Turkey 23 1.79 16.16 1.29 92.85 8.69 79.48 3.23 15.66 0.11 0.04 0.352 27.39 45.94 106.51 1.00 8.78 6.05 
UAE 26 2.43 14.49 2.39 176.04 4.95 61.97 3.55 14.76 0.14 0.02 0.461 18.72 51.13 29.28 0.00 - - 
West European Countries 
Austria 78 0.42 7.92 0.99 72.97 1.79 65.82 2.57 15.00 0.05 0.01 0.096 8.74 124.52 100.69 1.00 2.00 21.87 
Belgium 35 0.57 7.96 0.74 69.40 4.33 65.90 3.22 15.04 0.06 0.01 0.148 10.62 114.79 111.99 1.00 2.23 2.21 
Cyprus 8 0.63 7.08 1.34 76.36 13.70 88.69 3.32 15.13 0.06 0.01 0.115 15.31 - 97.64 1.00 2.91 3.82 
                   
Denmark 42 1.01 9.52 1.42 97.64 3.61 82.19 3.03 14.91 0.10 0.02 0.268 16.70 148.88 86.79 1.00 2.22 1.69 
Finland 8 0.60 7.91 0.94 89.40 14.71 - 3.36 16.53 0.07 0.01 0.162 12.72 70.65 100.27 1.00 1.87 3.16 
France 217 0.60 8.68 0.93 71.67 0.72 41.62 3.73 15.42 0.07 0.02 0.153 9.76 109.77 114.01 1.00 1.78 2.20 
                   
Germany 627 0.23 4.45 0.92 29.81 0.17 45.22 3.52 14.65 0.05 0.02 0.059 3.32 141.36 99.06 1.00 1.62 6.03 
Greece 16 0.42 6.62 0.13 48.19 8.64 73.18 3.49 16.03 0.08 0.03 0.164 23.52 98.14 93.05 1.00 3.30 3.92 
Ireland 37 0.47 9.60 1.25 141.43 5.49 71.58 3.11 16.58 0.05 0.00 0.129 10.59 141.36 99.06 1.00 3.77 6.03 
                   
Italy 168 0.72 8.65 1.21 73.46 0.97 54.75 3.46 15.69 0.08 0.02 0.112 12.97 107.36 88.06 1.00 2.36 1.23 
Luxembourg 64 0.58 11.84 1.09 132.79 2.04 39.23 7.93 15.32 0.05 0.01 0.183 8.11 125.17 105.36 1.00 2.40 4.12 
Malta 6 0.99 11.77 6.66 146.96 28.57 88.54 4.08 14.96 0.08 0.01 0.151 4.23 134.39 115.42 1.00 2.50 2.44 
                   
Netherlands 33 0.69 9.78 1.29 104.74 5.52 79.37 2.99 15.58 0.06 0.01 0.128 13.35 164.03 101.76 1.00 2.22 2.42 
Portugal 24 0.71 11.07 1.00 77.60 5.88 - 4.94 15.74 0.07 0.02 0.258 13.58 148.85 103.53 1.00 2.91 2.03 
Spain 109 0.76 9.73 1.41 108.07 1.99 59.50 2.10 16.03 0.07 0.01 0.205 17.40 141.11 122.72 1.00 3.22 3.77 
                   
Sweden 22 0.81 10.42 1.26 97.05 6.80 82.80 1.95 15.74 0.07 0.02 0.199 12.92 108.22 97.15 1.00 1.60 2.95 
UK 127 0.57 8.13 0.81 84.56 1.25 60.35 3.47 15.73 0.06 0.02 0.154 9.95 152.35 109.82 1.00 2.81 2.60 
 
This table shows summary statistics of the main variables in different countries. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3c     Descriptive statistics of dataset by bank types and region averages 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Banks in Emerging Economies 
(No. of Obs. 3080) 
Banks in Advanced Economies 
(No. of Obs. 16210) 
Total Banks 
(No. of Obs. 19290) 
Commercial Banks 
(No. of Obs. 2460) 
Non-commercial Banks 
(No. of Obs. 620) 
Commercial Banks 
(No. of Obs. 6350) 
Non-commercial Banks 
(No. of Obs. 9860) 
Commercial Banks 
(No. of Obs. 8810) 
Non-commercial Banks 
(No. of Obs. 10480) 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Bank Performance             
     ROAA 1.43 1.25 1.52 1.37 0.60 0.87 0.34 0.42 0.87 1.08 0.39 0.56 
     ROAE 13.38 8.17 12.78 8.78 9.16 8.62 5.43 4.57 10.52 8.71 5.78 5.10 
     Z-score 1.91 1.28 2.06 1.32 1.09 1.19 0.99 0.29 1.32 1.27 1.06 0.49 
     Interest Cov.Ratio 99.17 77.94 119.74 83.10 77.82 81.30 43.26 47.57 84.00 80.91 45.34 50.43 
Banking  Concentration             
     Market share 10.33 12.89 6.46 8.01 2.78 7.83 0.58 3.06 5.25 10.40 0.89 3.73 
    4 Firms Concentra.     75.55 13.13 76.09 12.36 55.53 17.22 49.36 12.49 61.59 18.53 51.05 14.08 
Bank-Specific Variables              
    Interest rate spread 7.94 5.17 4.24 8.73 4.50 5.85 2.60 2.49 6.22 5.64 3.42 2.94 
    Log(size) 14.92 1.42 14.70 1.35 15.37 1.61 14.93 1.20 15.22 1.56 14.92 1.21 
    Equity to total assets 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.03 
    Overheads to size 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
    Off-balance-sheet activities 0.245 0.190 0.210 0.222 0.161 0.169 0.076 0.080 0.191 0.180 0.082 0.096 
    Market growth (loans) 16.92 15.15 19.65 14.68 10.82 13.78 5.15 8.81 13.00 14.58 5.70 9.51 
Financial Structure               
     Domestic Credit  69.32 39.60 60.24 20.15 127.6 28.26 131.3 18.79 112.35 40.69 127.64 24.56 
     Stock Turnover Ratio 75.41 55.99 62.89 55.22 100.08 47.59 109.02 54.65 93.63 51.08 106.57 55.65 
     Regulation 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.93 0.25 0.93 0.25 
Macroeconomics             
     Inflation 3.81 2.59 3.81 2.59 2.10 0.87 2.10 0.87 2.28 1.28 2.28 1.28 
    GDP Growth 4.75 2.34 4.81 2.32 2.47 1.87 1.90 1.45 3.01 2.21 2.03 1.62 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the main variables in different economies for different bank types. 
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Emerging economies included East European and Middle Eastern countries. Advanced economies included West European countries. 
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Table4     Mean values and ranks of market structure and bank performance for emerging and advanced countries over 1999–2008 
 
Rank Market Growth – Total Assets (%) Market Share (%) 4-Firm Concentration (%) Normal Herfindahl Index ROAA ROAE Z-score Interest Coverage Ratio 
Rank of Eastern Europe 
1 Romania (36.44) Estonia (34.48) Slovakia (84.04) Estonia (0.32) Bulgaria (1.87) Estonia (16.79) Estonia (3.77) Bulgaria (127.67) 
2 Latvia (33.26) Lithuania (25.64) Latvia (83.01) Lithuania (0.23) Romania (1.65) Bulgaria (15.63) Lithuania (2.72) Czech–Rep (113.65) 
3 Bulgaria (30.48) Latvia (16.39) Romania (82.13) Romania (0.18) Estonia (1.61) Latvia (15.11) Latvia (2.12) Estonia (113.47) 
4 Lithuania (28.59) Slovakia (11.90) Czech (80.80) Poland (0.17) Latvia (1.57) Slovakia (13.80) Bulgaria (1.97) Hungary (85.47) 
5 Estonia (27.84) Bulgaria (11.63) Bulgaria (80.08) Slovenia (0.17) Poland (1.33) Hungary (13.59) Romania (1.68) Latvia (77.63) 
6 Poland (22.18) Romania (10.20) Hungary (74.27) Czech (0.15) Hungary (1.16) Czech (13.02) Hungary (1.59) Lithuania (77.62) 
7 Hungary (21.38) Hungary (9.52) Slovenia (74.09) Slovakia (0.14) Slovenia (1.09) Poland (12.91) Slovakia (1.45) Poland (75.36) 
8 Slovakia (20.19) Slovenia (9.43) Poland (70.65) Hungary (0.13) Czech (1.00) Romania (11.66) Poland (1.42) Romania (70.89) 
9 Czech (18.4) Poland (7.63) - Latvia (0.13) Lithuania (1.00) Lithuania (11.65) Czech (1.40) Slovakia (62.63) 
10 Slovakia (11.02) Czech (6.49) - Bulgaria0.12 Slovakia (0.95) Slovakia (10.59) Slovenia (1.25) Slovenia (62.08) 
Rank of Middle East 
1 Iran (37.65) Syria (20.83) Qatar (93.25) Jordan (0.25) UAE (2.43) Qatar (19.51) Qatar (4.20) Bahrain (179.57) 
2 Qatar (28.26) Qatar (16.95) Jordan (91.56) Qatar (0.23) Qatar (2.38) Saudi (18.61) Saudi (3.57) Saudi (179.10) 
3 UAE (25.25) Oman (14.08) Israel (85.17) Turkey (0.21) Saudi (2.33) Turkey (16.16) Kuwait (3.47) UAE (176.04) 
4 Syria (24.76) Jordan (11.11) Oman (83.52) Bahrain (0.16) Kuwait (2.28) Kuwait (16.12) Oman (3.38) Oman (164.04) 
5 Bahrain (23.82) Kuwait (11.11) Bahrain (82.75) Kuwait (0.15) Oman (2.24) Oman (14.90) Lebanon (2.71) Qatar (163.42) 
6 Turkey (21.28) Saudi (10.10) Kuwait (80.00) Iran (0.14) Turkey (1.79) Bahrain (14.52) UAE (2.39) Kuwait (159.23) 
7 Kuwait (17.71) Israel (9.52) Turkey (79.48) Israel (0.13) Bahrain (1.63) UAE (14.49) Israel (2.15) Syria (159.17) 
8 Oman (16.68) Iran (8.77) Iran (77.68) Oman (0.12) Iran (1.57) Iran (13.79) Jordan (209) Iran (122.05) 
9 Egypt (15.16) Turkey (8.69) Egypt (66.29) Egypt (0.1) Jordan (1.22) Lebanon (12.55) Bahrain (1.92) Lebanon (120.29) 
10 Saudi (15.06) Bahrain (8.47) Saudi (66.00) UAE (0.08) Egypt (0.86) Jordan (11.34) Turkey (1.29) Jordan (116.73) 
11 Jordan (12.35) Lebanon (7.41) UAE (61.97) Lebanon (0.06) Lebanon (0.83) Egypt (9.37) Iran (1.27) Turkey (92.85) 
12 Lebanon (11.77) UAE (4.95) Lebanon (59.35) Saudi (0.05) Israel (0.47) Israel (8.37) Egypt (0.83) Israel (50.70) 
13 Israel (6.67) Egypt (4.52) - - Syria (0.38) Syria (7.51) Syria (0.16) Egypt (39.67) 
Rank of Western Europe 
1 Finland (23.69) Malta (28.57) Cyprus (88.69) Finland (0.29) Denmark (1.01) Luxembourg (11.84) Malta (6.66) Malta (146.96) 
2 Greece (20.62) Finland (14.71) Malta (88.54) Denmark (0.21) Malta (0.99) Malta (11.79) Denmark (1.42) Ireland (141.43) 
3 Cyprus (19.59) Cyprus (13.70) Sweden (82.50) Cyprus (0.18) Sweden (0.81) Portugal (11.07) Spain (1.41) Luxembourg (132.79) 
4 Denmark (17.74) Greece (8.64) Denmark (82.19) Netherlands (0.16) Spain (0.76) Sweden (10.42) Cyprus (1.34) Spain (108.07) 
5 Spain (16.67) Sweden (6.8) Netherlands (79.37) Belgium (0.14) Italy (0.72) Netherlands (9.78) Netherlands (1.29) Netherlands (104.74) 
6 Sweden (14.83) Portugal (5.88) Greece (73.18) Ireland (0.13) Portugal (0.71) Spain (9.73) Sweden (1.26) Denmark (97.64) 
7 Netherlands (14.76) Netherlands (5.52) Ireland (71.58) Malta (0.13) Netherlands (0.69) Ireland (9.60) Ireland (1.25) Sweden (97.05) 
8 Portugal (13.91) Ireland (5.49) Belgium (65.90) Austria (0.12) Cyprus (0.63) Denmark (9.52) Italy (1.21) Finland (89.40) 
9 UK (13.63) Belgium (4.33) Austria (65.82) France (0.08) Finland (0.60) France (8.68) Luxembourg (1.09) UK (84.56) 
10 Ireland (13.56) Denmark (3.61) UK (60.35) Sweden (0.08) France (0.60) Italy (8.65) Portugal (1.00) Portugal (77.60) 
11 Malta (13.37) Luxembourg (2.04) Spain (59.50) Germany (0.07) Luxembourg (0.58) UK (8.13) Austria (0.99) Cyprus (76.36) 
12 Italy (13.01) Spain (1.99) Italy (54.75) Italy (0.05) Belgium (0.57) Belgium (7.96) Finland (0.94) Italy (73.46) 
13 Austria (11.32) Austria (1.79) Germany (45.22) Spain (0.05) UK (0.57) Austria (7.92) France (0.93) Austria (72.97) 
14 France (10.09) UK (1.25) France (41.62) Luxembourg (0.04) Ireland (0.47) Finland (7.91) Germany (0.92) France (71.67) 
15 Luxembourg (10.08) Italy (0.97) Luxembourg (39.23)  UK (0.03) Austria (0.42) Cyprus (7.08) UK (0.81) Belgium (69.40) 
16 Belgium (7.85) France (0.72) - Greece (0.01) Greece (0.42) Greece (6.82) Belgium (0.74) Greece (48.19) 
17 Germany (5.35) Germany (0.17) - - Germany (0.23) Germany (4.45) Greece (0.13) Germany (29.81) 
 - Not available; Ratios are calculated for each bank in each country and then averaged over the country's sample period.                                                                         
 
- Market growth is the inflation-adjusted growth rate of bank assets.  
- Market share is the share of a bank’s assets to total assets in the national market. 4-firm market concentration is the fraction of assets held by the four largest banks in each country.   
- ROAA is return on average assets, which is defined as profit before tax as a percentage of total assets of a bank.  
- Normal Herfindahl index is a concentration ratio measured as sum of square of market share.  
- ROAE is return on average equity, which is defined as profit before tax as a percentage of equity a bank.  
- Z-score is defined as [(ROAA+CAR)/SROAA], where ROAA is return on average assets, CAR represents capital assets ratio, and SROAA stands for standard deviation of return on assets. Interest coverage is defined as profit plus interest 
expenses divided by interest expenses.   
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the BankScope database of the IBCA. 
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Table 5      Determinants of the returns (ROAA and ROAE): emerging economies vs. advanced economies 
 
Variable 
Panel A: ROAA Panel B: ROAE 
Banks in emerging economies Banks in advanced economies Banks in emerging economies Banks in advanced economies 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Market Structure         
     Market share 0.0068 
(0.37) 
 0.0148** 
(2.04) 
 0.1253 
(0.74) 
 0.2059** 
(2.23) 
 
     4-firms concentration -0.0293*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.0293*** 
(-3.30) 
0.0010 
(1.23) 
0.0005 
(0.54) 
-0.1417* 
(-1.81) 
-0.1453* 
(-1.76) 
0.0083 
(0.76) 
0.0017 
(0.15) 
Bank-Specific Variables          
     Interest rate spread  0.0979*** 
(5.89)  
0.0660*** 
(14.77) 
 0.7639*** 
(4.72) 
 0.5049*** 
(7.75) 
 
     Log(total assets) (t-1) -0.3488* 
(-1.87) 
-0.2326 
(-1.44) 
0.2309*** 
(8.04) 
0.0438** 
(2.17) 
-6.0079*** 
(-3.42) 
-3.7804** 
(-2.51) 
1.5681*** 
(4.19) 
0.3084 
(1.23) 
     Equity to total assets 1.0125*** 
(4.86) 
1.2702*** 
(6.22) 
0.7297*** 
(19.15) 
0.6809*** 
(17.60) 
3.3359 
(1.64) 
6.6954*** 
(3.42) 
3.6481*** 
(6.94) 
3.0023*** 
(5.87) 
     Overheads to total assets(t-1) -0.4604* 
(-1.85) 
-0.3590 
(-1.33) 
-0.2234*** 
(-5.43) 
-0.2411*** 
(-5.68) 
-4.8612** 
(-2.00) 
-3.0891 
(-1.18) 
-0.9763* 
(-1.80) 
-0.8309 
(-1.53) 
    Off-balance-sheet activities to total 
assets 
0.0894 
(0.27) 
0.3716 
(1.07) 
-0.3100** 
(-2.52) 
-0.6359*** 
(-5.01) 
0.5945 
(0.19) 
3.1297 
(0.97) 
-7.6776*** 
(-4.76) 
-9.4448*** 
(-5.85) 
     Loan growth  0.0068** 
(2.49) 
0.0061** 
(2.06) 
0.0020*** 
(3.20) 
0.0013** 
(2.05) 
0.0506* 
(1.90) 
0.0455 
(1.59) 
0.0132* 
(1.68) 
0.0095 
(1.19) 
     Bank age 0.0624** 
(2.33) 
 -0.0411*** 
(-9.01) 
 0.8101*** 
(3.22) 
 -0.2769*** 
(-4.65) 
 
     Ownership (foreign banks) 0.0479*** 
(3.23) 
 -0.1521*** 
(-3.95) 
 0.0485** 
(2.04) 
 -0.1286*** 
(-4.37) 
 
Overall Financial Structure          
     Domestic credit  provide by banking  -0.0136*** 
(-4.53) 
-0.0125*** 
(-3.71) 
0.0011** 
(1.97) 
0.0023*** 
(4.12) 
-0.0942*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.0879*** 
(-2.72) 
0.0445*** 
(5.98) 
0.0516*** 
(7.13) 
     Stock turnover ratio 0.0024 
(1.35) 
0.0041** 
(2.30) 
0.0006** 
(2.24) 
-0.0004* 
(-1.68) 
0.0344** 
(2.08) 
0.0559*** 
(3.41) 
0.0007 
(0.20) 
-0.0054* 
(-1.72) 
     Regulation -0.2611* 
(-1.81) 
 0.1414 
(0.77) 
 -0.3015 
(-1.43) 
 0.1211 
1.76 
 
Macroeconomics         
     Inflation 0.0007 
(0.04) 
0.0178 
(1.03) 
-0.0459*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.0668*** 
(-5.25) 
0.0055 
(0.04) 
0.1948 
(1.21) 
-0.6123*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.7473*** 
(-4.79) 
     GDP growth 0.0042 
(0.31) 
0.0076 
(0.52) 
0.0139*** 
(3.33) 
0.0188*** 
(4.34) 
0.1463 
(1.13) 
0.1727 
(1.25) 
0.3068*** 
(5.75) 
0.3290*** 
(6.14) 
Vector Products         
     Market share* Interest rate spread  -0.0012*** 
(-3.95) 
 0.0137*** 
(6.51) 
 -0.0008* 
(-1.72) 
 0.1288*** 
(4.58) 
     Market share*bank age  0.0007 
(1.20) 
 0.0000 
(0.34) 
 0.0095* 
(1.78) 
 0.0027* 
(1.71) 
    Market share*ownership  -0.0305 
(-0.99) 
 -0.0007 
(-0.033) 
 -0.0278 
(-0.10) 
 0.5693** 
(2.22) 
     Market share*regulation  0.0069 
(0.25) 
 -0.0211 
(-1.49) 
 0.0294 
(0.11) 
 -0.4978*** 
(-2.79) 
Bank Type  and Regional Dummies         
     Dummy investment 1.0429** 
(2.45) 
1.0365** 
(2.22) 
0.3089*** 
(3.26) 
0.3236*** 
(3.33) 
1.9427 
(0.42) 
0.0101 
(0.00) 
0.6610 
(0.53) 
0.9938 
(0.79) 
     Dummy Islamic 0.3631 
(1.30) 
0.2638 
(0.86) 
 
 
3.8242* 
(1.73) 
3.2373 
(1.35) 
 
 
     Dummy real estate 1.2973* 
(1.72) 
0.5860 
(0.73) 
-0.0855 
(-1.58) 
-0.1506*** 
(-2.74) 
9.4551 
(1.52) 
4.5504 
(0.69) 
-3.0842*** 
(-4.52) 
-3.4622*** 
(-5.06) 
     Dummy savings 1.2929** 
(2.21) 
1.1935* 
(1.85) 
-0.2048*** 
(-6.56) 
-0.2600*** 
(-8.22) 
11.0146** 
(2.20) 
10.4600* 
(1.91) 
-3.8423*** 
(-9.72) 
-4.1703*** 
(-10.55) 
     Dummy cooperative -0.7500 
(-1.41) 
-0.8482 
(-1.45) 
-0.1532*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.2264*** 
(-7.06) 
-4.5876 
(-0.99) 
-5.1311 
(-1.02) 
-2.9335*** 
(-7.23) 
-3.4655*** 
(-8.66) 
     Dummy Middle East 0.2815* 
(1.87) 
0.3079* 
(1.78) 
  1.2535 
(0.94) 
1.3655 
(0.91) 
  
         
AR(1) ρ=0.0589 
(t-value=0.88) 
ρ=0.0419 
(t-value=0.64) 
ρ=-0.0262 
(t-value=-1.20) 
ρ=0.0023 
(t-value=0.10) 
ρ=0.0664 
(t-value=0.94) 
ρ=-0.3722
*** 
(t-value=-5.37 
ρ=0.0084 
(t-value=0.41) 
ρ=0.0093 
(t-value=0.46) 
Correlated Random Effects -Hausman test    67.70
*** 
   51.21
*** 
   213.89
*** 
   123.10
*** 
   58.83
*** 
   48.46
*** 
   18.19
*** 
   183.59
*** 
Redundant Fixed Effects – Likelihood 
Ratio 
   475.24
*** 
   464.95
*** 
   3350.63
*** 
   3346.10
*** 
   431.46
*** 
   423.98
*** 
   3312.15
*** 
   3449.72
*** 
F-statistic 15.38 12.94 13.20 11.87 7.34 6.24 9.71 9.55 
R2-adjusted 0.83 0.81 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.65 0.65 0.64 
Standard error of regression 0.43 0.46 0.26 0.27 3.99 4.25 3.28 3.30 
No. of countries 23 23 17 17 23 23 17 17 
No. of banks 123 123 687 687 119 119 683 683 
No. of observations 387 387 3356 3356 367 367 3316 3316 
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
 
- The dependent variable in panel A is return on average assets, which is defined as profit before tax as a percentage of total assets of a bank.  
- The dependent variable in panel B is return on average equity, which is defined as profit before tax as a percentage of equity a bank.  
- Market share*interest rate spread is an interaction term of market share and interest rate spread.  
- Market share*age is an interaction term of market share and bank age. Market share*ownership is an interaction term of market share and foreign 
ownership. Market share*regulation is an interaction term of market share and regulation.  
- We estimate all regressions using country and time fixed effects and clustering at bank level. t-values are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. AR (1): Arellano-Bond test that average auto-covariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
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Table 6     Determinants of risk (Z-score and Interest Coverage Ratio): Emerging economies vs. advanced 
economies 
 
Variable 
Panel A: Z-score Panel B: Interest Coverage Ratio (Interest Multiplier) 
Banks in emerging economies Banks in advanced economies Banks in emerging economies Banks in advanced economies 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Market Structure         
     Market share 0.0396* 
(2.07) 
 0.0063** 
(2.07)  
0.0225 
(1.28) 
 0.0556*** 
(5.08) 
 
     4-firms concentration -0.0176 
(-1.58) 
-0.0013 
(-0.11) 
-0.0029*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.0028*** 
(-5.52) 
-0.0131 
(-1.33) 
-0.0135 
(-1.31) 
0.0008 
(0.43) 
0.0009 
(0.48) 
Bank-Specific Variables          
     Interest rate spread  0.0427** 
(1.98)  
0.0006*** 
(1.97) 
 0.0926*** 
(4.54) 
 0.0298*** 
(3.36) 
 
     Log(total assets) (t-1) -0.5314 
(-0.33) 
-0.0021 
(-0.01) 
0.0039 
(0.22) 
0.0015 
(0.13) 
-0.1951 
(-0.87) 
-0.0205 
(-0.11) 
0.0896 
(1.30) 
0.0632 
(1.39) 
     Equity to total assets (t-1) 0.5207** 
(2.15) 
0.4100** 
(2.25) 
0.2551** 
(2.15) 
0.1778* 
(1.89) 
1.1495*** 
(4.24) 
1.4226*** 
(5.38) 
0.8539*** 
(9.65) 
0.8236*** 
(9.80) 
     Overheads to total assets(t-1) 1.2460*** 
(3.92) 
1.4169*** 
(4.56) 
0.0815*** 
(3.84) 
0.0726*** 
(3.62) 
-0.5177* 
(-1.71) 
-0.3659* 
(-1.72) 
-0.3912*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.3645*** 
(-4.47) 
    Off-balance-sheet activities to total 
assets 
0.1345 
(0.28) 
0.4788 
(1.08) 
0.2207*** 
(3.15) 
0.2061*** 
(3.05) 
0.7435* 
(1.75) 
1.0780** 
(2.46) 
0.5730** 
(2.01) 
0.6167** 
(2.16) 
     Market growth (total loans) 0.0069* 
(1.81) 
0.0082** 
(2.14) 
0.0009** 
(2.37) 
0.0010*** 
(2.72) 
0.0059* 
(1.72) 
0.0057 
(1.58) 
0.0029** 
(2.12) 
0.0021 
(1.59) 
     Bank age 0.2335*** 
(6.79) 
 -0.0023 
(-0.85) 
 0.0930*** 
(2.71) 
 -0.0058 
(-0.53) 
 
     Ownership (foreign banks) 0.2762** 
(2.05) 
 0.0303** 
(1.97) 
 0.0953** 
(2.23) 
 0.3205*** 
(3.72) 
 
Overall Financial Structure          
     Domestic credit  provide by banking  -0.0203*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.0253*** 
(-5.75) 
0.0012*** 
(3.71) 
0.0016*** 
(5.28) 
-0.0027 
(-0.69) 
-0.0025 
(-0.59) 
0.0073*** 
(6.17) 
0.0073*** 
(6.19) 
     Stock turnover ratio 0.0008 
(0.31) 
0.0061*** 
(2.61) 
0.0003 
(1.51) 
0.0003* 
(1.65) 
0.0030 
(1.28) 
0.0058\** 
(2.49) 
-0.0004 
(-0.68) 
-0.0005 
(-0.88) 
     Regulation -1.1503*** 
(-7.57) 
 0.9381*** 
(15.71) 
 -0.2297** 
(-2.53) 
 0.0673 
(0.20) 
 
Macroeconomics         
     Inflation -0.0304 
(-1.47) 
-0.0591*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.1292*** 
(-16.90) 
-0.1293*** 
(-17.39) 
-0.0455** 
(-2.32) 
-0.0211 
(-1.01) 
-0.1070*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.1111*** 
(-3.98) 
     GDP growth 0.0623*** 
(3.10) 
0.0812*** 
(4.09) 
0.0400*** 
(15.20) 
0.0411*** 
(16.14) 
0.0460** 
(2.54) 
0.0474** 
(2.49) 
0.0667*** 
(6.94) 
0.0669*** 
(6.95) 
Vector products         
     Market share* Interest rate spread  0.0021 
(1.32) 
 0.0023** 
(2.39) 
 0.0008 
(0.56) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.03) 
     Market share*bank age  0.0021*** 
(2.91) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.16) 
 0.0007 
(1.01) 
 -0.0004 
(-1.41) 
    Market share*ownership  0.0896*** 
(2.90) 
 0.0049*** 
(3.47) 
 0.0121*** 
(4.42) 
 0.0073*** 
(3.19) 
     Market share*regulation  0.0319** 
(2.50) 
 -0.0005* 
(-1.90) 
 0.0107*** 
(3.38) 
 -0.0744*** 
(-3.96) 
Bank Type  and Regional Dummies         
     Dummy investment 0.2437 
(0.43) 
0.3040 
(0.56) 
0.0087 
(0.18) 
0.5649 
(1.00) 
0.5587 
(1.48) 
0.5180 
(1.32) 
0.6243 
(1.46) 
0.5951 
(1.50) 
     Dummy Islamic -0.0301* 
(-1.85) 
-0.0454 
(-0.14) 
 
 
0.1873 
(0.81) 
0.0917 
(0.39) 
 
 
     Dummy real estate 0.1822 
(0.25) 
0.0155 
(0.02) 
0.0523 
(0.82) 
0.0663 
(0.09) 
0.3086 
(0.44) 
-0.2512 
(-0.35) 
0.2604 
(0.37) 
-0.3237 
(-0.44) 
     Dummy savings 0.3957 
(0.50) 
0.4714 
(0.61) 
0.0079 
(0.53) 
0.7288 
(0.92) 
0.6066* 
(1.66) 
0.6220 
(1.14) 
0.6407 
(1.22) 
0.6979 
(1.26) 
     Dummy cooperative 0.2002 
(0.29) 
-0.0030 
(-0.01) 
-0.0151 
(-0.99) 
-0.1621 
(-0.23) 
-0.3517 
(-0.77) 
-0.4716 
(-0.99) 
-0.3924 
(-0.85) 
-0.5443 
(-1.12) 
     Dummy Middle East 0.8163*** 
(4.28) 
0.7549*** 
(3.87) 
 
 
0.2221** 
(2.14) 
0.3069** 
(2.05) 
 
 
         
AR(1) ρ=-0.0570 
(t-value=-0.94) 
ρ=0.0709 
(t-value=0.96) 
ρ=0.0285 
(t-value=1.28) 
ρ=0.0110 
(t-value=0.49) 
ρ=0.0513 
(t-value=0.92) 
ρ=0.0280 
(t-value=0.50) 
ρ=0.1373
*** 
(t-value=6.89) 
ρ=0.1382
*** 
(t-value=6.92) 
Correlated Random Effects -Hausman test    120.95
*** 
   97.53
*** 
   132.30
*** 
   165.27
*** 
   50.72
*** 
   39.71
*** 
   161.01
*** 
   171.79
*** 
Redundant Fixed Effects – Likelihood 
Ratio 
   349.03
*** 
   302.69
*** 
   2205.08
*** 
   2198.88
*** 
         
*** 
   288.93
*** 
   3503.64
*** 
   3521.97
*** 
F-statistic 3.68 3.28 5.90 5.93 8.77 7.74 14.40 14.31 
R2-adjusted 0.46 0.42 0.49 0.49 0.72 0.69 0.73 0.73 
Standard error of regression 0.90 0.93 0.18 0.18 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.64 
No. of countries 23 23 17 17 23 23 17 17 
No. of banks 132 132 728 728 130 130 717 717 
No. of observations 454 454 3711 3711 427 427 3614 3614 
Bank dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering level Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
 
- The dependent variable in panel A is the Z-score, which is defined as [(ROAA+CAR)/SROAA], where ROAA is return on average assets, CAR 
represents capital assets ratio, and SROAA stands for standard deviation of return on assets.  
- The dependent variable in panel B is the Interest coverage ratio (interest multiplier) is defined as profit plus interest expenses divided by interest expenses.   
- Market share*interest rate spread is an interaction term of market share and interest rate spread.  
- Market share*age is an interaction term of market share and bank age. Market share*ownership is an interaction term of market share and foreign 
ownership.  
- Market share*regulation is an interaction term of market share and regulation.  
- We estimate all regressions with mean data for every year and clustering at bank level. t-values are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. AR (1): Arellano-Bond test that average auto-covariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
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Figure 1. Trend of return on average assets by categories of 
market type. 
 
This plot shows the trend of return on average assets by market 
types from 1999 to 2008.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Trend of 4-firm concentration by categories of 
market type. 
Figure 2. Lorenz Curve by categories of market type.  
 
 
This figure displays the Lorenz Curve of average total assets during 
the period 1999-2008.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Trend of normalized Herfindahl index by categories 
of market type. 
 
 
This plot shows the trend of market concentration (total assets) by 
market types from 1999 to 2008.  
 
 
 
This plot shows the trend of concentration by market types from 
1999 to 2008.  
 
- ROAA (return on average assets) measured as net income as a percentage of total assets, market share measured as a percentage of a 
bank’s assets to total assets of banks in the country in question, concentration measured as a percentage of four-bank assets to total 
assets in the country operated, and a Herfindahl index measured as a square of total market shares of all banks operated in each 
country. For more detail, see Section 3 of this article. 
- Market categories are emerging and advanced economies. Banks included are commercial, investment, Islamic, real estate, savings, 
and corporate banks. The data are from BankScope. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the BankScope database of the IBCA. 
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